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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the auditor’s sensitivity to manipulative financial reporting by investigating the 
relation between audit fees and segment-level manipulations.  Segment reporting provides an 
interesting setting to examine auditor risk assessments because of the discretion afforded to 
management under existing regulations.  Segment manipulations, a form of classification 
smoothing, are not in violation of accounting standards; nevertheless, these manipulations violate 
the spirit of faithful representation by distorting the performance of a subset of the reporting unit 
at the expense of (or to the benefit) of another subset.  Because disaggregated information is used 
by analysts and investors in bottom-up forecasting, these distortions can influence firm value even 
though they do not affect bottom-line net income.  Our measure of classification smoothing 
measures cost shifting between core operating segments and non-core segments to proxy for 
segment manipulation.  We find that audit fees, a proxy for the auditor’s risk assessment, have a 
positive association with segment-level manipulations.  Subsequent analyses suggest that higher 
audit fees are also due to the additional effort exerted in the presence of segment-level 
manipulations.  Further, auditors appear justified in charging higher fees to clients that engage in 
segment manipulations as we document evidence of a positive association between restatements 
and segment-level manipulations.  Collectively, these results suggest that auditors are aware of 
the risk associated with companies that engage in segment-level manipulations and auditors 
respond appropriately by charging higher fees and doing additional work. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
n the Sarbanes-Oxley era, auditors are under regulatory pressure to design audits that employ a ‘risk-
based’ approach. For instance, in 2010 the PCAOB issued a suite of risk-assessment standards to increase 
auditor sensitivity to the risks of material misstatements. These standards call for auditors to respond to 
company-specific factors that affect management’s judgments in determining accounting estimates as well as factors 
perceived to influence managerial incentives.
1
 In this paper, we examine the auditor’s sensitivity towards the 
manipulation of segment-level results.  
 
Segment manipulations are a form of classification smoothing where a reporting segment’s performance is 
distorted by allocating costs to (or from) other segments. These manipulations can conform to accounting standards 
but may nevertheless be indicative of management adopting an aggressive approach to financial reporting. Further, 
because segment reporting is used by financial statement users in constructing bottom-up forecasts of future growth 
rates, manipulation of segment results is misleading even when the consolidated financial performance is unaffected. 
We specifically consider how audit fees vary with the level of segment reporting manipulations. To the degree that 
                                                 
1 The eight new auditing standards are: Audit Risk (AS. No. 8); Audit Planning (9); Supervision of the Audit (10); Consideration 
of Materiality in Planning and Performing an Audit (11); Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement (12); The 
Auditor’s Responses to the Risks of Material Misstatement (13); Evaluating Audit Results (14); and Audit Evidence (15). 
I 
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auditors price segment-level manipulations, we gain insight into auditors’ attentiveness to the potential risk of this 
influential financial statement disclosure. 
 
While previous research has established that audit fees vary with the level of accrual management (Gul et 
al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2006; Antle and Gordon 2006; Choi et al. 2010; Schelleman and Knechel 2010), researchers 
have yet to consider whether audit fees vary with classification management techniques, including segment-level 
manipulations. Broadly, classification management involves the re-classification of financial statement items for the 
purpose of enhancing certain performance measures, such as core earnings, without changing bottom-line net 
income.
2
  Account manipulation to improve the perception of the firm has been extensively discussed and 
researched.
3
 Classification smoothing was the focus of McVay’s (2006) research which showed that managers will 
shift expenses out of operating income to more transitory “special items.” While classification management may 
conform to reporting standards, it may nevertheless reveal evidence of an aggressive reporting culture set by the 
tone of upper management.  The auditor may assess such a tone as a significant risk factor. 
 
Segment-level classification management is the manipulation of how consolidated performance is 
disaggregated in the notes to the financial statements. Current segment reporting requirements grant managers 
significant discretion which could lead to the horizontal shifting of income and expenses between segments (Givoly 
et al. 1999; Lail et al. 2013).
4
 For example, managers have the discretion to shift expenses from core (or operating) 
segments to non-core segments (or vice-versa) as long as such a shift complies with the chosen segment definitions 
and measure of performance.
5
 Manipulating segment classification allows managers to “window dress” financial 
statements by improving reported results in favored industrial sectors or geographic regions. Segment manipulations 
can be accomplished either by shifting expenses from one division to another or by favorably grouping divisions 
when constructing reported segments. While this manipulation does not alter consolidated net income, it can 
enhance (reduce) the reported performance of some key segments to the detriment (advantage) of others. Research 
has shown that segment results are important to many financial statements users including security analysts, 
investors, regulators, and academics (e.g., Kinney 1971; Collins 1976; Baldwin 1984; Thomas 2000; Berger and 
Hann 2003; Ettredge et al. 2005). Because analysts and investors weigh core operating performance heavily when 
forecasting earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Gu and Chen 2004), managers have 
incentives to manipulate core operating profitability.  Alternatively, managers may have incentives to disguise high 
segment performance to forestall competition.   
 
Segment-level reporting manipulations present a unique audit research setting as they may provide a more 
useful proxy for managerial aggressiveness than abnormal accruals used in traditional earnings management studies. 
Because auditors are expected to constrain artificially inflated accruals, the reported level of accruals represents the 
joint product of auditor and client efforts (Choi et al. 2010). In contrast, an auditor’s primary task as it relates to 
segment reporting is verifying consistency between internal and external definitions of segments. Thus, the auditor 
is not charged to restrain managerial opportunism in this area. This suggests that segment-level manipulation 
provides accounting researchers a better measure of unconstrained managerial aggressiveness or “tone at the top” 
than abnormal accruals.  
 
 To investigate whether auditors are sensitive to the risk of segment manipulation, we examine the relation 
between audit fees and unexpected segment performance. Audit fees are a proxy for the auditor’s risk assessment 
and auditor effort (Hay et al. 2006). A positive association would suggest auditors are aware of segment-level 
manipulations and interpret such behavior as a meaningful risk factor. Alternatively, a negative association would be 
indicative of auditors exerting lower than expected effort to detect management’s segment-level manipulations. If 
                                                 
2 Core earnings is operating income before depreciation and special items. 
3 See Stolowy and Breton (2004) for a review of the literature.  
4 The current reporting standard for segment reporting originated with Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 131 
which can now be found in Accounting Standards Codification Topic 280. 
5 A core segment characterizes those that comprise the main operations of the company – particular product lines, industries, 
customer types, etc. Non-core segments include corporate types that predominantly hold non-operating income. See our Research 
Design section for further discussion. 
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auditors are unaware of segment level manipulations or do not believe segment-level manipulations are a risk factor, 
then no significant association between audit fees and segment-level manipulations may exist. Ex-ante the 
appropriate relationship is unclear. 
 
We test the association between segment-level manipulations and audit fees with a standard audit fee 
model. Our measure of segment manipulation is the sum of unexpected segment performance across all line-of-
business core operating segments for the company, where an individual segment’s unexpected performance is equal 
to a segment’s return-on-sales less its respective industry’s return on sales. After controlling for abnormal 
performance, positive (negative) unexpected segment performance for a company would be suggestive of 
management’s use of segment transfers to inflate (deflate) the profitability of particular core segments via non-core 
segments (Lail et al. 2013). We find that segment manipulations are positively associated with increased audit fees. 
These results are consistent with a higher risk assessment and/or increased work.  
 
To better understand why auditors would price segment-level manipulation, we consider two additional 
tests. First, we investigate the association between audit lag (i.e. days to complete the audit) and segment-level 
manipulations. Using an audit lag model, we find a positive association between segment-level manipulations and 
audit lag consistent with auditors doing a greater amount of work when clients engage in segment manipulations. 
Second, we consider whether there is an association between restatements and segment level-manipulations. We 
find some evidence that segment manipulation is positively associated with the occurrence of a future restatement, 
suggesting that auditors are justified in assessing a higher risk to these clients. Collectively, these results suggest that 
auditors are aware of the risk associated with companies that engage in segment level manipulations and that 
auditors respond appropriately by charging higher fees and doing additional work.  
 
Our results have implications for auditors. First, while we find evidence that auditors are attentive to the 
risk associated with permissible aggressive reporting, it is unclear whether their response is sufficient to address the 
risk. Second, auditors may need to discuss evidence suggesting aggressive segment reporting decisions with the 
audit committee as such behavior may indicate a larger aggressive reporting culture. Third, our findings suggest that 
when auditors detect segment manipulation, they also perform additional work. Audit committees should consider 
providing additional resources when auditors can provide evidence that this resource request is linked to observable 
risk factors.  
 
In the next section, we provide background literature that motivates the study leading to our research 
question. In Section III, we describe the research design and sample selection process. Section IV provides our 
results; Section V concludes. 
 
II.  PRIOR LITERATURE 
 
Classification Shifting and Segment Reporting 
 
Given earnings management is pervasive and costly to investors (Levitt 1998; Healy and Wahlen 1999; 
Graham et al. 2005), auditors are expected to detect and prevent it. Recent studies have found that if auditors are 
effective at deterring accruals-based earning management, then managers use alternative strategies to manipulate 
earnings. As predicted in Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005)’s analytical model, Chi et al. (2011) find that when auditors 
constrain accruals, managers engage in more extensive real earnings management. Cohen et al. (2008) show that in 
the post-SOX era, management is more likely to employ real earnings management strategies because of the 
perceived increase in the auditor’s effectiveness at constraining accruals. Yet, real earnings management is arguably 
more detrimental to share value than accrual management because managers destroy real long-term value to achieve 
short-term earnings goals (Roychowdhury 2006).  
 
As an alternative, managers may use a form of classification management to achieve reporting goals 
(McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Fan and Liu 2012). Classification management involves distorting how specific 
items are classified on the financial statements by shifting these costs from core operations in order to make them 
appear more transitory in nature. Classification management is not isolated to vertical shifting at the consolidated 
level (i.e., from operating expenses to non-operating losses); horizontal classification characterizes the approach of 
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shifting revenue and expenses between segments (i.e., from core to “other” segments). The horizontal manipulation 
of segment performance became a more likely strategy with the introduction of SFAS 131. The pronouncement, 
effective at the end of 1998, addressed many of the informational demands with its “through the eyes of 
management” approach to segment reporting whereby companies are required to disaggregate segment performance 
into core operating segments – those segments of the company evaluated by key internal decision makers.6 This 
approach to segment definitions, as well as not prescribing a particular measure for segment earnings, has 
introduced a large amount of subjectivity. SFAS 131 also does not require an allocation of corporate overhead costs 
to the core segments. As a result, considerable discretion exists in how management distributes these expenses, if at 
all (see SFAS 131, paragraphs 81 and 84).  
 
This setting provides a unique opportunity to examine the level of aggressiveness in management’s 
reporting behavior as well as determine if auditors respond to manipulated segment-level representations put forth 
by upper management. Managers may distort segment information by aggregating segments with very different 
performance characteristics to enhance the reported performance of core segments (Harris 1998; Botosan and 
Stanford 2005; Ettredge et al. 2006; Berger and Hann 2003, 2007; Bens et al. 2011). Additionally, managers may 
transfer expenses between segments in order to improve the reported performance of core segments (Lail et al. 
2013).  Alfonso et al. (2012) investigate the segment-to-firm reconciliation and find that firms with higher leverage, 
losses, and high earnings volatility are more likely to report reconciliations that do not sum to reported consolidated 
performance.  
 
Managers may prefer segment manipulation over other earnings management strategies such as accruals 
management. Unlike accruals management, segment manipulations do not reverse in the subsequent years. Similar 
to real earnings management, segment manipulations remain in conformity with GAAP.
7
 Yet, unlike real earnings 
management, segment manipulations do not negatively impact the long-term performance of the company. A 
downside to segment classification shifting is the potential creation of internal conflicts between segment managers; 
however, upper management’s ultimate concern is with the performance of the company and the company’s stock. 
Management may believe that classification shifting facilitates meeting these goals. In addition, upper management 
would be cognizant of true segment performance which should alleviate potential internal conflicts between segment 
managers. 
 
Auditors and Segment Reporting 
 
While possibly conforming to the technical requirements of the reporting standards, segment manipulations 
may be indicative of an aggressive reporting strategy. If auditors detect aggressive reporting strategies, they should 
be wary of the tone at the top culture established by management for the entire company. Tone at the top can be a 
significant audit issue in that it signals to employees the importance of meeting short-term reporting goals. Prior 
work has found that auditors charge higher fees to clients that engage in aggressive reporting behavior such as 
accruals management (Choi et al. 2010, Abbott et al. 2006, Gul et al. 2003, Schelleman and Knechel 2010). There is 
also evidence that auditors price real earnings management even though it is in compliance with GAAP (Sohn 
2011). This suggests that even if segment-level manipulations technically comply with GAAP standards, the auditor 
may still elect to price them.  
 
What makes our research setting particularly interesting is that ex-ante it is not obvious if auditors consider 
segment reporting an area that deserves special attention. The auditing standards regarding segments in existence 
prior to the enactment of the PCAOB 2010 risk assessment suite noted that “the auditor is not required to apply 
procedures as extensive as would be necessary to express an opinion on the segment information taken by itself.” 
Essentially, the auditor must verify that the same segment reporting measures are used for internal and external 
reporting, a requirement of SFAS 131. This appears to be a relatively straightforward audit task consisting of the 
review of internal segment reports and management’s segment footnotes. Additionally, the PCAOB risk assessment 
                                                 
6 Specific auditor guidelines relating to segment reporting can be found under PCAOB AU Section 9326.28 - .41:  “Applying 
Auditing Procedures to Segment Disclosures in Financial Statements” for fiscal years ending on December 15, 2010 or sooner. 
7 For a detailed background on real earnings management, see Roychowdhury (2006). 
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suite expects auditors to focus their efforts on higher risk areas. Bowlin (2011) finds that if the auditors do not 
perceive an item as a strategic risk they allocate fewer resources to auditing that item.  
 
Recently regulators have shown an increased interest in segment disclosures. The SEC has expressed 
concerns that the disaggregation process and footnote disclosures are inconsistent with segment reporting standards 
(Johnson 2010). Over one-quarter of all SEC comment letters regarding accounting rule violations specifically 
discuss segment disclosure problems.
8
 Further, in 2005, the PCAOB inspection report for Ernst & Young 
specifically identified that the firm’s audit procedures missed “improper aggregation of reporting segments [which] 
resulted in the offsetting of operating profits at one segment with losses at another” (PCAOB 2005). Paul and 
Largay (2005) conclude that all stakeholders in the financial reporting process should be aware of the complicity of 
auditors in segment-level misreporting.  
 
Research Question 
 
If segment reporting is not considered a significant audit issue, it is unclear if auditors will be sensitive to 
risks associated with segment classification manipulation. To assess auditor sensitivity, we consider whether there is 
an association between segment-level manipulations and audit fees. In general, auditors respond to risk factors by 
charging the client a risk premium and/or doing additional testing, both of which result in higher fees (Hay et al. 
2006). Competing arguments can be made for audit fees to be positively, negatively or not associated with segment-
level manipulations.  
 
Even if auditors detect evidence of segment-level manipulations, it also remains unclear whether this will 
result in increased audit fees. In the Sarbanes-Oxley era, the audit committee plays a critical role in authorizing 
additional audit testing and settling auditor-management disputes. When dealing with auditor-management disputes, 
the audit committee’s decisions are highly dependent upon the clarity of the underlying standard (Klein 2002; 
Gendron et al. 2004). Agoglia et al. (2011) finds that auditors have little support from the audit committee when 
dealing with imprecise standards. Given the subjective nature of segment reporting, it would be unlikely that an 
auditor could persuade an audit committee to authorize further work or require that the segment disclosures be 
amended. 
 
While the previous argument suggests that the risk associated with segment-level manipulations may go 
undetected by auditors, auditors have incentives to detect and price segment-level manipulations. The SEC comment 
letters and PCAOB inspection reports suggest that regulators expect auditors to be aware of segment issues. 
Therefore, auditors should assess a higher level of engagement risk for their multi-segment clients that show 
evidence of classification management. A higher engagement risk results in higher audit fees, more extensive use of 
high-risk specialist personnel and industry experts, more intensive testing, and more thorough reviews (Bedard and 
Johnstone 2004). The auditor may also assign a higher engagement risk because of the heightened litigation risk 
associated with earnings management in general (St. Pierre and Anderson 1984; Heninger 2001).  
 
The presence of segment-level manipulations could also be evidence of a compromised audit. In other 
words, management may be able to persuade the auditor to tolerate segment-level manipulations if fees are high. 
Choi et al. (2010) find that when auditors are paid abnormally high fees, they are more likely to permit aggressive 
accruals management. Likewise, the auditors’ willingness to tolerate segment-level manipulation may increase with 
client fees.  
                                                 
8 As reported in the Audit Analytics Database as of June 30, 2012. Note: the Audit Analytics database classifies all comment 
letters into six categories (Accounting Standards, Mergers & Acquisitions, New and Secondary Registrations, Non Standard and 
Other Disclosures, Operational Control & Risk Assessments, and Securities Regulations) and over 2,500 subcategories. Consider 
the following example from Macy’s (received May 23, 2012): “We note you aggregate your operating divisions into one 
reportable segment. Please clarify for us and in your disclosure whether your operating divisions are operating segments. Given 
the significant growth of your dot com/online and ecommerce businesses in recent years, please explain to us how you considered 
them, along with catalog sales, if applicable, as reportable segments. If so, explain to us how macy’s.com and bloomingdales.com 
continue to meet the aggregation criteria within ASC 280-10-50- 11 for aggregation. In doing so, please provide us the data and 
the substantive factors you considered in determining that the segment(s) have similar economic characteristics including 
exhibiting similar long-term prospects.” 
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 A negative association between audit fees and segment manipulations is a possibility if the presence of 
segment-level manipulations is indicative of the auditor failing to exert sufficient effort to detect manipulations. If 
management is able to effectively manipulate segment-level reporting, the auditor may not have performed 
sufficient testing of the segment disclosures as compared to what may be expected from regulatory agencies. Given 
the correlation between audit work and audit quality, low audit quality may be accompanied by low audit fees. 
Blankley et al. (2012) find that abnormally low audit fees are associated with future restatements, and Frankel et al. 
(2002) suggest that auditors are more likely to allow biased financial reporting by low-fee clients than by high-fee 
clients. 
 
 Because strong theoretical arguments exist for audit fees to be positively, negatively, or not associated with 
segment-level manipulations, we formally state our research question in the null as: 
 
Hypothesis:  There is no relation between audit fees and segment-level manipulations. 
 
III.  RESEARCH DESIGN & SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Audit Fee Model 
 
To determine the influence of segment-level manipulation on audit fees, we use a two-stage approach 
analyzing data from 2005 through 2009. In the first stage, we estimate segment-level manipulation through a 
methodology that focuses on reported core segment performance versus expected core segment performance. We 
define core segment earnings as the sum of operating segment earnings, which specifically excludes any “corporate” 
or “other” segment types that contain non-operating income and/or expenses. While not all multi-segment 
companies utilize an “other” segment, many disclose such a segment that captures items including corporate-level or 
headquarter costs, smaller segments not required for disclosure, and other costs typically not allocated to the core 
segments or not easily attributed to a particular segment. Common other expenses include pension, research and 
development, options, and net interest costs. We require the presence of this “other” segment as it facilitates 
reallocations. We specifically exclude this other segment from our calculation for core segment earnings as this 
segment may be a conduit for shifting (Lail et al. 2013). 
 
We calculate expected core segment earnings using an industry-adjusted return on sales model similar to 
Berger and Hann (2003, 2007) and calculate unexpected core segment earnings as the difference between actual and 
expected core segment earnings. Unexpected core segment earnings arise when actual core earnings for a particular 
firm-year are higher (or lower) than is typical when compared to that segments’ industries. Positive unexpected core 
segment earnings occur for two reasons: (1) the segment is truly outperforming the other segments in its industry; or 
(2) management has used inter-segment transfers to boost the performance of the segment either at the detriment of 
another segment or by transferring costs to the other segment. Our research question focuses on the latter; therefore, 
we control for overall firm performance in an attempt to isolate manipulations in segment reporting.
9
 
 
Specifically, unexpected core segment earnings (SEG_MAN) are defined as the weighted-average 
unexpected return on sales across all s segments for firm i in year t, excluding non-operating segments. For each 
segment s, we measure segment return on sales (ROS) as the segment’s operating performance divided by segment 
sales. We compare this to the return on sales for the same industry as segment s (IROS). Industries are defined based 
on the lowest level of SIC code, and a minimum of ten observations must be available within the industry to 
compute IROS.
10
 We then weight the difference in ROS and IROS for each segment by its proportion of segment 
                                                 
9 Our argument follows from the typical agency motive where underperformance of segments is undesirable to disclose due to 
market consequences. The segment literature has documented such manipulative behavior by managers (see Berger and Hann 
2003). An alternative motive suggesting negative unexpected core segment earnings is proprietary concerns. Harris (1998) 
documents that managers are motivated to hide strongly performing segments in less competitive industries to maintain an 
advantage; however, researchers have been unable to consistently document proprietary cost motives. 
10 We use a four-digit SIC industry match when possible, but where the number of segment-years is insufficient to calculate an 
appropriate industry return-on-sales (< 10), we next match the segment with a three-digit SIC return-on-sales. This is necessary 
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sales (        
 ) to the sum of all segment sales (        ) in year t.
11
  
 
                    
       
   
        
 
        
 
 
   
 (1) 
 
In the second stage, we use a standard audit fee model to determine the association between audit fees and 
our measure of segment manipulation (SEG_MAN). Specifically, we regress logged audit fees (LAF) on variables 
controlling for audit effort, risk, and industry using the robust cluster technique suggested by Petersen (2009). Our 
fee model is adapted from recent prior studies (e.g., DeFond et al. 2002; Whisenant et al. 2003; Francis and Wang 
2005; Krishnan et al. 2005; Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009; Choi et al. 2010):  
 
Audit Fee Model: 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 ,
13 , 14 , 15 , 16 19 20 31
_ _i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
LAF SEG MAN LTA CR CA TA ARINV ROA
LOSS FOREIGN MERGER BUSY LEV INTANG
SEG OPINION MATWEAK YEARCON IN
      
     
     
      
     
     ,i tDCON 
 (2) 
 
where, 
 
LAF   = logarithm of audit fees; 
SEG_MAN = segment manipulation variable discussed above; 
LTA   = logarithm of end of year total assets; 
CR  = current assets divided by current liabilities; 
CA_TA  = current assets divided by total assets; 
ARINV  = sum of accounts receivable and inventory divided by total assets 
ROA  = earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets; 
LOSS  = 1 if firm incurred a loss and 0 otherwise; 
FOREIGN  = 1 if firm has any foreign operations, 0 otherwise; 
MERGER  = 1 if the firm reported the impact of a merger or acquisition on net income, 0 otherwise; 
BUSY   = 1 if a company’s fiscal year is in December or January, 0 otherwise; 
LEV   = long-term debt divided by total assets; 
INTANG = ratio of intangible assets to total assets; 
SEG   = logarithm of number of business segments; 
OPINION  = 1 if the auditor issues a going concern audit opinion, 0 otherwise; 
MATWEAK = 1 if the client receives a material weakness opinion in the current or previous year, 0 
otherwise; 
YEARCON = Year Fixed Effects; 
INDCON = Industry Fixed Effects. 
 
The coefficient on SEG_MAN (β1) specifically addresses our research question. A positive (negative) 
coefficient would be indicative of higher (lower) audit fees when segment manipulation is greater. Knowing that our 
SEG_MAN measure could be indicative of abnormal performance, we include ROA and LOSS in an attempt to 
                                                                                                                                                             
for less than 10% of our segments. Finally, we use a two-digit SIC match when a three-digit match in unavailable. This is 
necessary for less than 1% of our segments. 
11 Prior research also measures unexpected core earnings using a classification model at the consolidated level (McVay 2006). 
For example, expected core earnings at the consolidated level can be modeled as a function of lagged core earnings, lagged 
accruals, sales, asset turnover, and stock returns (Fan et al. 2010). Employing such a model at the segment level poses a 
considerable challenge due to lack of segment-specific data. Therefore, we calculate unexpected core segment earnings using an 
industry-adjusted return-on-sales approach similar to Berger and Hann (2003, 2007). 
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isolate the manipulation we intend to capture. While we expect audit fees to be positively associated with abnormal 
performance, after controlling for firm-level performance, we expect β1 to illustrate the association between audit 
fees and segment manipulation. 
 
We control for audit effort with LTA, FOREIGN, MERGER, SEG and OPINION, and audit risk with CR, 
CA_TA, ARINV, ROA, LOSS, and INTANG. LEV captures the long-term financial structure of the client. BUSY is an 
indicator variable if the company has a busy season year-end. MATWEAK is included to control for the presence of a 
SOX Section 302 material weaknesses in the current or prior fiscal year.
12
 Finally, we also include year fixed-effects 
and consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2003), we include industry controls (INDCON). 
 
Sample 
 
Our sample is a combination of three data sets – audit fees from Audit Analytics, company information 
from Compustat, and segment data from the segment portion of the Compustat database – from 2005 to 2009. Our 
sample period begins in 2005 to ensure that all firms were required to comply with SOX 404 internal control 
reporting.
13
 Consistent with prior literature, we exclude firms in the financial services industry (SIC 6000-6999), 
foreign filers, and those lacking any data required for variable calculations.
14
 Our measure of segment manipulation 
requires that we limit the sample to firms with multiple line-of-business segments which equates to 9,735 firm years 
in our sample period. Approximately 40% have an identifiable “other” segment necessary for our study, and we 
require at least ten companies per year within each industry to calculate SEG_MAN, resulting in a sample of 2,803 
firm years. This set of firm-years is then combined with the data from Audit Analytics. We limit our sample to Big 
N clients in order to ensure relative homogeneity in audit capacity and also eliminate firms that paid no audit fees or 
those that paid audit fees to multiple audit firms. Companies paying no fees are unlikely to have normal audits and 
those employing multiple firms make interpretation of the results problematic. Our final combined sample includes 
2,415 firm-years (representing 10,740 segments) having all the necessary data for our models.  
 
IV.  RESULTS 
 
 As a preliminary analysis, we examine basic descriptive statistics (reported in Table 1). As expected, our 
variable of interest, SEG_MAN, is close to zero as it essentially represents a residual of performance. Only for those 
companies with segments that are strongly out-performing their respective competition or manipulating performance 
would we expect SEG_MAN to be positive and significant. Our average audit fees are over two million dollars, 
consistent with our sample covering the relatively large firms that have multiple segments. Sample companies 
average 4.4 segments (unlogged from the SEG variable) with a strong foreign presence (FOREIGN), have kept its 
auditor for at least nine years (TENURE), are profitable (EPR), and have positive free cash flow (FREEC). We find 
17% of our sample received a material weakness opinion suggesting many firms in our sample had weak internal 
controls. From our correlation analysis in Table 2, the primary relationships of interest are those with SEG_MAN. 
We find that segment manipulation is positively associated with audit fees as well as the likelihood of future 
restatements (RES_FUT).  
 
Table 3 shows the results for our audit fee model. Consistent with prior research, our model explains 
approximately 80% of the variation in audit fees. With the exception of ARINV, BUSY, and OPINION, all variables 
are at least significant at the 10% level. We find a positive significant association between SEG_MAN and audit fees 
                                                 
12 In an untabulated robustness test, we also consider an internal control measure based on SOX Section 404 reports. We elect to 
report the 302 measure as increasingly few firms report SOX Section 404 material weaknesses. According to the Audit Analytics 
Database, the number of SOX Section 404 material weaknesses reported each year has declined from 2004 to 2010 which 
corresponds with a decrease in the percent of firms receiving a material weakness on the 404 internal control opinion from 12.5 
percent in 2004 to 3.4 percent in 2010. 
13 Audit fees have only been a required disclosure since 2000. Prior to 2005, there was no auditor provided opinion on internal 
controls. 
14 We exclude foreign filers because they were not required to issue an internal control opinion prior to July 2007; in addition, the 
audit lag function may depend upon the country of operations. 
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(coefficient 0.82, t-stat 2.62). This suggests that after controlling for other risk factors, auditors price segment-level 
manipulations. As previously explained, ex-ante plausible arguments existed for a positive, negative or no relation 
between audit fees and segment manipulations. With respect to our research question, we find that auditors both 
identify and price segment manipulations. Because our proxy for segment manipulation, SEG_MAN, could also 
represent abnormal competitive advantages for a firm on a segment-by-segment basis, we consider whether firms 
that perform well are charged higher fees. Specifically, we note that ROA, a proxy for performance, is negatively 
associated with audit fees (t-stat 4.25). Thus, we conclude that the positive association found in Table 3 is indicative 
of segment manipulation, not segment performance, providing upward pressure on audit fees. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Continuous Variables  Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
LAF 14.55 14.48 1.04 13.88 15.23 
SEG_MAN (0.08) 0.00 2.13 (0.03) 0.05 
LTA 7.35 7.34 1.67 6.33 8.44 
CR 2.08 1.65 1.69 1.18 2.35 
CA_TA 0.40 0.38 0.22 0.22 0.55 
ARINV 0.25 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.35 
ROA 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.05 0.12 
LEV 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.35 
INTANG 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.05 0.35 
SEG  1.49 1.39 0.63 1.39 2.08 
BTM (1.29) 0.45 41.74 0.26 0.66 
LAG 4.14 4.09 0.24 4.03 4.28 
TENURE 2.32 2.20 1.01 1.61 3.00 
EPR 1.44 2.07 46.29 0.99 4.25 
FIN 0.12 0.03 0.32 0.00 0.13 
FREEC 0.03 0.04 0.16 (0.00) 0.08 
Rates of Occurrence 
     LOSS 0.09 
    FOREIGN 0.66 
    MERGER 0.18 
    BUSY 0.75 
    OPINION 0.01 
    MATWEAK 0.17 
    RES_FUT 0.08 
    EPSGROW 0.08 
    EXITEM 0.04 
    ACC 0.32 
    LACC 0.54 
    Variable Definitions are as follows: LAF = logarithm of audit fees; SEG_MAN = segment manipulation variable; LTA = 
logarithm of end of year total assets (in 1000s); CR = current ratio; CA_TA = current assets divided by total assets; ARINV = sum 
of accounts receivable and inventory divided by total assets; ROA = earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets; 
LEV = long term debt divided by total assets; INTANG = ratio of intangible assets to total assets; SEG = logarithm of number of 
business segments; BTM = book-to-market ratio; LAG = logarithm of audit lag; TENURE = logarithm of the number of years the 
auditor has been the auditor for the client; EPR = income from continuing operations scaled by market capitalization at the end of 
the year; FIN = the sum of cash raised from the issuance of long-term debt, common stock and preferred stock deflated by total 
assets; FREEC = the sum of cash from operations less average capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets; LOSS = 1 if 
firm incurred a loss, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN = 1 if firm has any 0 foreign sales, 0 otherwise; MERGER = 1 if the firm reported 
the impact of a merger or acquisition on net income, 0 otherwise; BUSY = 1 if a company’s fiscal year is in January or December, 
0 otherwise; OPINION = 1 if the auditor issued a going concern audit opinion, 0 otherwise; MATWEAK = 1 if the client receives 
a 302 material weakness opinion in the current or previous year, 0 otherwise; RES_FUT = 1 if the firm restates this year’s 
income, 0 otherwise; EPSGROW = 1 if the company had positive earnings change for four consecutive quarters, 0 otherwise; 
EXITEM = 1 if the client reports an extraordinary item, 0 otherwise; ACC = 1 if the firm was an accelerated filer, 0 otherwise; 
LACC = 1 if the firm was a large accelerated filer. 
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Table 2: Correlations 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) LAF 
              (2) LAG (0.23)* 
             (3) RES_FUT (0.02) 0.07* 
            (4) SEG_MAN 0.07* (0.01) 0.01 
           (5) LTA 0.80* (0.39)* (0.04)* 0.08* 
          (6) CR (0.30)* 0.06* (0.01) (0.04)* (0.36)* 
         (7) CA_TA (0.15)* 0.10* 0.01 (0.05)* (0.45)* 0.47* 
        (8) ARINV (0.01) 0.05* (0.01) 0.05* (0.25)* 0.06* 0.70* 
       (9) ROA (0.13)* (0.14* (0.04)* 0.31* 0.22* (0.03) (0.06)* 0.12* 
      (10) LOSS (0.20)* 0.21* 0.09* (0.15)* (0.30)* 0.21* 0.19* (0.05)* (0.44)* 
     (11) FOREIGN 0.33* (0.03) 0.01 0.06* 0.09* 0.10* 0.30* 0.33* 0.10* (0.07)* 
    (12) MERGER 0.13* (0.01) 0.01 0.02 0.08* (0.03) (0.07)* 0.00 0.01 (0.04) 0.09* 
   (13) BUSY 0.07* (0.03) (0.12)* (0.02) 0.13* (0.08)* (0.16)* (0.14)* (0.03) 0.00 (0.07)* (0.00) 
  (14) LEV 0.11* 0.04* (0.02) 0.00 0.17* (0.22)* (0.42)* (0.27)* 0.08* (0.08)* (0.16)* 0.08* 0.11* 
 (15) INTANG 0.25* (0.02) (0.02) 0.04* 0.17* (0.14)* (0.30)* (0.17)* 0.08* (0.15)* 0.25* 0.26* (0.01) 0.17* 
(16) SEG_MAN 0.07* (0.07)* (0.01) 0.03 0.05* 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 0.05* (0.07)* (0.02) 0.01 0.00 (0.05)* 
(17) OPINION (0.04) 0.16* (0.01) (0.05)* (0.11)* (0.07)* 0.03 (0.01) (0.35)* 0.20* (0.02) (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 
(18) MATWEAK 0.03 0.32* (0.10)* 0.01 (0.15)* (0.00) 0.09* 0.08* (0.07)* 0.14* 0.04* 0.01 (0.03) (0.02) 
(19) EPSGROW (0.05)* 0.07* (0.04)* 0.01 0.03 (0.06)* (0.07)* (0.06)* 0.00 (0.08)* (0.06)* (0.05)* 0.06* 0.13* 
(20) BTM (0.06)* (0.05)* 0.02 (0.00) (0.03) 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.03) -0.01 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 
(21) EXITEM 0.12* 0.03 0.05* 0.01 0.12* (0.06)* (0.06)* (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) 0.02 0.02 0.05* 0.01 
(22) TENURE 0.16* (0.20)* (0.01) 0.02 0.15* (0.02) 0.06* 0.09* 0.05* (0.07)* 0.10* (0.03) (0.04)* (0.15)* 
(23) ACC (0.32) 0.21* 0.06* (0.05)* (0.44)* 0.14* 0.15* 0.09* (0.12)* 0.16* (0.06)* (0.01) (0.11)* (0.05)* 
(24) LACC 0.48* (0.44)* (0.04)* 0.05* 0.58* (0.13)* (0.17)* (0.09)* 0.18* (0.24)* 0.14* 0.06* 0.09* (0.01) 
(25) EPR 0.05* (0.05)* 0.01 0.03 0.06* (0.11)* 0.00 0.05* 0.13* (0.13)* 0.01 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 
(26) FIN 0.02 0.06* 0.03 0.01 -0.02 (0.08)* (0.03) 0.08* 0.03 0.01 (0.01) 0.10* (0.03) 0.28* 
(27) FREEC 0.14* (0.12)* (0.01) 0.26* 0.17* 0.02 0.01 0.09* 0.88* (0.33)* 0.15* 0.04* (0.03) -0.01 
  
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
(15) INTANG 
             (16) SEG_MAN 0.04* 
            (17) OPINION (0.06)* (0.04) 
           (18) MATWEAK (0.06)* (0.04) 0.11* 
          (19) EPSGROW (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
         (20) BTM 0.01 0.00 (0.35)* (0.08)* 0.01 
        (21) EXITEM (0.01) 0.01 0.05* 0.08* 0.02 (0.10)* 
       (22) TENURE (0.04) 0.19* (0.04)* (0.11)* (0.06)* 0.04* 0.03 
      (23) ACC (0.06)* (0.02) 0.06* 0.12* (0.05)* 0.02 (0.03) (0.05)* 
     (24) LACC 0.12* 0.09* (0.12)* (0.17)* (0.18)* 0.05* 0.04 0.18* (0.74)* 
    (25) AUD_IND 0.09* (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)* 0.07* 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.10)* 0.02 
   (26) EPR 0.05* (0.01) (0.06)* (0.01) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06* (0.04)* 0.05* 0.05 
  (27) FIN 0.04 (0.04) 0.01 0.03 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) (0.07)* 0.05* (0.06)* 0.01 (0.07) 
 (28) FREEC 0.14* 0.05* (0.37)* (0.05)* (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.07* (0.10)* 0.15* 0.14* 0.00 0.00 
* significant at the 5% level. See Table 1 for variable definitions 
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Table 3 
Audit Fee Model 
Dependent Variable: LAF Coef t-stat p-value** 
CONSTANT 9.30  34.97  0.00  
SEG_MAN 0.82  2.62  0.01  
LTA 0.57 40.96 0.00  
CR (0.08)  (5.36)  0.00  
CA_TA 1.28  8.64  0.00  
ARINV 0.11 0.65 0.51  
ROA (0.30)  (4.25)  0.00  
LOSS 0.13  2.54  0.01  
FOREIGN 0.24  5.22  0.00  
MERGER 0.05 1.68 0.09  
BUSY 0.01 0.14 0.89  
LEV 0.29 3.51  0.00  
INTANG 0.52  5.09  0.00  
SEG 0.06  2.50  0.01  
OPINION 0.13  1.05  0.29  
MATWEAK 0.35  8.82  0.00  
R-squared 0.80      
N 2,415      
Note: The above model (2) was estimated using the robust cluster technique by company as suggested in Petersen (2009). 
Industry and year controls were included.  
**All p-values are two-tailed.  
See Table 1 for variable definitions.  
 
Further Analysis 
 
Two possible, but not mutually exclusive, explanations exist as to why audit fees are positively associated 
with segment-level manipulation: the auditor may either be charging a risk premium or the auditor may be 
increasing their effort. Under the risk premium argument, auditors charge the client higher fees without doing 
additional work. Auditors may assess a higher risk premium on firms that manipulate segment performance, 
suggesting that the tone at the top set by upper management raises some additional concerns for the auditor. This is 
tantamount to an insurance company charging higher fees to a higher risk client. Under the additional effort 
argument, the auditor responds to risk associated with segment-level manipulations by conducting additional tests.  
 
To test which of these causes is driving the elevated fees for firms with segment manipulation, we examine 
audit report lag. Audit report lags are defined as the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the date of the 
audit report. Prior research indicates that audit report lags are directly related to the amount of work the auditor 
needs to do (Ashton et al. 1989; Carslaw and Kaplan 1991; Henderson and Kaplan 2000; Knechel and Payne 2001). 
Thus, a longer lag would be associated with additional audit work. Under a risk premium argument, we would not 
expect segment manipulations to be associated with audit lag, while for the additional work argument we would 
expect a positive association between segment manipulation and audit lag. Consistent with Knechel and Sharma 
(2009) and Krishnan and Yang (2009), we use the following model: 
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i t i t i t i t t
LAG SEG MAN CR ROA LOSS EPSGROW BTM
EXITEM LEV BUSY LTA MERGER FOREIGN
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      
     
     
      
     
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18 , 19 22 23 34 ,
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i t i t
ACC
LACC YEARCON INDCON                         
(3) 
 
where all variables except those noted below are defined as in model (2): 
 
LAG =  logarithm of number of days between when the auditor issues the audit report and the 
fiscal year end.  
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EPSGROW =  1 if the company had a positive earnings change for four consecutive quarters, 0 
otherwise; 
BTM =  book-to-market ratio; 
EXITEM =  1 if the firm reports an extraordinary item, 0 otherwise; 
TENURE =  logarithm of the number of years the auditor has been the auditor for the client 
ACC =  accelerated filer 
LACC =  large accelerated filer. 
 
We include six variables to control for audit risk: the current ratio (CR), return on assets (ROA), the 
incurrence of a loss (LOSS), consistent earnings growth (EPSGROW), book-to-market value (BTM), and the 
reporting of an extraordinary item (EXITEM). Following Francis (1984), we include leverage (LEV) as a measure of 
the long-term financial structure of the client. We also include an indicator variable if the company has a fiscal year-
end in December or January (BUSY) which proxies for the effect of the audit busy season. We also include five 
different measures to control for audit effort: total assets (LTA); the presence of mergers (MERGER), foreign 
operations (FOREIGN), and the number of business segments (SEG) all of which capture complexity in operations; 
and the issuance of a going concern audit opinion (OPINION), which captures financial distress. Each of these 
measures proxies for characteristics of the client that likely require additional audit effort.  
 
In addition, we include several variables to control for firm and company characteristics that could have 
some influence on audit report lags. We include the length of the auditor’s tenure with the client (TENURE) which 
control for audit efficiency effects (Knechel et al. 2009). We also include variables capturing both the firm’s status 
as an accelerated filer (ACC) and a large accelerated filer (LACC) to control for the impact of the SEC’s filing 
deadlines on audit lags. To control for internal control quality, we include a variable defined as the presence of a 
section 302 material weakness in the current or prior fiscal year (MATWEAK). Finally, we include controls for year 
fixed-effects (YEARCON) and industry fixed-effects (INDCON). 
 
Table 4 
Audit Lag Model 
Dependent Variable: LAG Coef t-stat p-value** 
CONSTANT 4.55 106.02 0.00 
SEG_MAN 0.31 3.34 0.00 
CR (0.01) (1.54) 0.12 
ROA 0.01 0.16 0.88 
LOSS 0.05 2.39 0.02 
EPSGROW (0.02) (0.92) 0.36 
BTM 0.00 1.49 0.14 
EXITEM 0.03 1.09 0.28 
LEV 0.06 2.21 0.03 
BUSY (0.00) (0.13) 0.89 
LTA (0.03) (6.36) 0.00 
MERGER 0.02 1.42 0.16 
FOREIGN 0.03 2.65 0.01 
SEG 0.00 0.21 0.84 
OPINION 0.15 2.15 0.03 
TENURE (0.01) (2.99) 0.00 
MATWEAK 0.13 8.03 0.00 
ACC (0.13) (6.59) 0.00 
LACC (0.21) (10.99) 0.00 
R-squared 0.35 
  N 2,415 
  Note: The above model (3) was estimated using the robust cluster technique by company as suggested in Petersen (2009). 
Industry and year controls were included. 
**All p-values are two-tailed.  
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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As reported in Table 4, our audit lag model explains 35% of the variation in audit lag.
15
 With respect to 
segment manipulations (SEG_MAN) we find a significant positive association between lag and segment 
manipulations (0.31, t = 3.34). This suggests that not only are auditors assessing greater risk to clients (as seen by 
higher audit fees) when segment disclosures indicate a potential manipulation, the auditors are also exerting greater 
effort to examine the situation. 
 
 As a final consideration, we examine whether a risk premium is justifiable. We examine the association 
between segment-level manipulations and future restatements. If segment-level manipulations are associated with 
future restatements, then this suggests a higher engagement risk that would necessitate a risk premium. Consistent 
with Romanus et al. (2008), Aier et al. (2005), and Richardson et al. (2002), the restatement model we use is: 
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     
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 (4) 
 
where all variables except those noted below are defined as in models (2) and (3): 
 
RES_FUT_ =  1 if the firm restates this year’s financial statements, 0 otherwise; 
EPR =  earnings-to-price ratio, defined as income from continuing operations scaled by market 
capitalization at the end of the year; 
FIN =  financing raised, defined as the sum of additional cash raised from the issuance of long-
term debt, common stock and preferred stock deflated by total assets;
 FREEC =  demand for external financing, measured as the sum of cash from operations less average 
capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets; 
 
 Variables capturing market pressure include an earnings multiple (EPR) and book-to-market (BTM) to 
control for the market’s perception of future growth. We include EPSGROW, which proxies for the pressure to 
maintain a string of earnings increases. We also include an indicator variable to indicate a loss before extraordinary 
items (LOSS) and return on assets (ROA). 
 
Financial risk is captured with three variables. FREEC proxies for the extent to which the firm needs 
external financing, and FIN captures the actual amount of financing within the capital markets. We control for 
leverage (LEV) because evidence suggests that companies with debt covenant constraints upwardly manipulate 
earnings. To control for complexity, we include variables representing firm size (LTA), foreign operations 
(FOREIGN), and the number of business segments (SEG). Finally, we also include the internal control indicator 
variable, MATWEAK, which we expect to be positively associated with restatements. We also include controls for 
year fixed-effects (YEARCON). 
 
 As reported in Table 5, we find evidence that segment manipulations are positively associated with future 
restatements (p<0.05 one-tailed). While segment manipulations are not GAAP violations, the existence of such 
behavior is either indicative of other manipulative behavior or egregious enough on its own to mislead financial 
statement users. This evidence provides further support for regulators’ push for greater focus to be given to segment 
disclosures.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
15 This is similar to R-square reported in recent research (Ettredge et al. 2006). 
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Table 5 
Future Restatement Probit Model 
Dependent Variable: RES_FUT B z p-value** 
CONSTANT (1.23) (4.96) 0.00 
SEG_MAN 20.34 1.70 0.09 
EPR 0.00 0.82 0.41 
EPSGROW (0.31) (1.88) 0.06 
LOSS 0.30 1.78 0.08 
BTM 0.00 1.15 0.25 
ROA (1.56) (2.78) 0.01 
FIN 0.15 1.11 0.27 
FREEC 1.13 2.07 0.04 
LEV  (0.05) (0.22) 0.83 
LTA (0.00) (0.13) 0.90 
FOREIGN 0.03 0.27 0.79 
SEG  (0.01) (0.18) 0.85 
MATWEAK 0.31 2.72 0.01 
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 
  N 2,415 
  Note: The above model (4) was estimated using a robust logistic model clustered by company as suggested in Peterson (2009). 
Industry and year controls were included. 
**All p-values are two-tailed.  
See Table 1 for variable definitions.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 This study considers the relationship between audit fees and segment-level manipulation as an appropriate 
setting to examine an auditor’s sensitivity to aggressive financial reporting. Understanding how segment level 
manipulations are related to audit fees is critically important for at least three reasons: (1) the increasing regulatory 
emphasis on adequate segment-level disclosures; (2) the attention given to segment disclosures by financial 
statement users, particularly analysts; and (3) the risk that clients engage in classification management, a type of 
account manipulation. Our findings have important implications for auditors, investors, and boards. First, auditors 
need to be attentive to evidence of segment level manipulations. Second, investors need to be aware that despite 
higher fees and longer audits, managers engage in segment manipulations. Lastly, boards and audit committees need 
to recognize the potential additional risk their firm faces when managers have the discretion to manipulate segment 
reporting. 
 
Using a sample of firms that issued internal control reports from 2005 to 2009, we find that audit fees are 
positively associated with segment level manipulations. This indicates that auditors are either aware of segment 
manipulations or have uncovered evidence correlated with manipulated segment disclosures, which raises concerns 
for the auditor. In either case, the auditor prices this risk. To test whether this association is a result of a risk 
premium or additional work, we examine the association between audit lag and segment-manipulations. We find that 
the auditor is taking longer to complete the audit for companies engaging in segment manipulation, indicative of the 
auditor doing additional work. Lastly, we examine whether the elevated fees are justified by examining the 
association between segment manipulations and future restatements. We find that the likelihood of future 
restatements is positively associated with segment manipulations which seem to justify the elevated fees. 
 
 Our research is subject to some limitations. We have restricted our study to the behavior of Big-N audit 
firms; therefore, the possibility exists that non-Big N clients may respond differently to segment-level manipulations 
as they may have less experience dealing with multi-segment clients. Also, the adoption of the PCAOB Risk 
Assessment suite in 2010 has made auditors more acutely aware of the risk associated with segment level 
manipulation, so our results may not generalize to periods following adaption of these standards. 
 
 Our research suggests a number of potential future research projects. We have suggested that classification-
management is part of an assortment of account management techniques that includes real and accruals 
management. Future research should consider whether a hierarchy of these earnings management techniques exists 
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and whether the prevention of one increases the likelihood managers employ another technique. Finally, researchers 
should consider how governance elements may influence an auditor’s willingness to tolerate classification 
management. 
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